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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
. NATURE OF THE CASE 
· is an appeal in a judicial review matter. It is an appeal from the March 21, 2014 
Memorandum Opinion of the District Court, the Honorable John R. Stegner presiding, denying 
relief to the petitioner-appellant relative to the August 9, 2013, dete1mination by a hearing 
examiner of the Idaho Department of Transportation sustaining the suspension of the petitioner's 
driving privileges as a result of allegedly producing a valid breath test result in excess of the legal 
limit. 
2. COURSE OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
This being an appeal in a judicial review matter, the record has a different format than 
most appeals. The only real testimony consists of the transcript of the administrative license 
suspension hearing. Any references to that transcript will be via the usual nomenclature of "Tr.". 
A second portion of the record before the court consists of a DVD containing the video recording 
of the interaction between the officer and Mr. Vvernecke at the time of the stop and subsequent 
aJTest. It was an exhibit in the administrative license suspension hearing and a copy was 
forwarded to the court in the judicial review hearing. This video is something which both 
counsel and the coult in the judicial review proceeding at the district court level watched. Since 
what was said in that video is part of the record below, and is salient to this appeal, the members 
of the court are asked to review it as well. Finally, there is the standard Clerk's Record from the 
District Court which, in the nature of this sort of case, included the entirety of the Agency Record 
of the Idaho Transportation Depaiiment from the administrative license suspension hearing. We 
will refer to that Clerk's Record with the customary symbology of"R", plus the bate-stamped 
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number at the lower right portion of the page. We will note that a bit of concentration is 
required because not only are the copies of the Agency Record which are part of the Clerk's 
Record bate-stamped with the District Court clerk's page number at the lower right of the page 
but are also bate-stamped with the Idaho Department of Transportation page numbers as well. 
Although the law maintains a fiction otherwise, the State initiated the process in this 
matter on July 6. 2013, by issuing a notice of suspension to the petitioner. (R., pp. 21-22) That 
would have been meaningless, however, unless the State proceeded further. The State, ho\vever, 
did proceed fu1iher when the officer involved, Douglas D. Fairley, faxed to the Depaiiment a 
Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of Arrest an/or Refusal to Take Test dated July 7, 2013. 
(R., pp. 24 -27) The petitioner then timely submitted a Request for hearing, per the statute. (R., 
pp. 30-33). A notice of hearing ,vas issued. (R., pp. 43-44) The notice of the hearing indicated 
that the hearing examiner, Eric G. Moody, may take judicial notice of the records maintained by 
the Idaho Transportation Department, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, all manuals 
adopted under ID APA Rules 11.03.01 and 39.02. 72, Idaho statutes, and reported court decisions. 
(R., p. 43-) A telephonic hearing ,vas held on July 29, 2013. (Tr., p. 1) The hearing examiner 
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on August 9, 2013 (R., pp. 50 60 
The petitioner commenced this administrative review by timely filing his Petition for Judicial 
Review on August 19, 2013. (R., pp. 61-63) Various briefing was done by the parties and they 
made argument on February 24, 2104. (R., p. 186) At that time, the District Comi, in 
consideration of some additional legal autho1ity which the paiiies had not raised, allowed the 
paiiies to submit additional briefing and then re-argue the matter. (R., p. 160) The matter was re-
argued on February 24, 2014. (R., p. 186) Following that, the comi entered its Memorandum 
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Decision. (R., 187 - 197) The petitioner then timely filed his notice of appeal. (R., pp. 198-
3. STATE~IENT OF THE FACTS 
The petitioner-appellant ,vas a1Tested for DUI on July 6, 2013. (R., 24; Tr., p. 4) The 
officer claimed that the petitioner-appellant was driving in the middle of the road. (R., p. 25) 
Unfortunately, the police video ,vas so unskillfully done that it fails to shO\v any of the driving. 
The defendant testified that, because of vehicles parked along the street on which he was driving, 
the narrow nature of the street, the large size of his own vehicle, and some road obstruction, his 
driving ,vas not improper. (Tr., p. 6, 1.9 p. 9, 1. 14) The petitioner-appellant testified that he felt 
fine to drive. (Tr., p. 9, 11. 15-16; p. 11, 11. 9-11) The officer had the petitioner-appellant perform 
some field sobriety tests. The officer claimed, of course that the petitioner-appellant flunked the 
gaze nystagmus test but admitted that the petitioner-appellant passed two (2) others. The 
petitioner-appellant was unable, due to bad balance, to perfon11 the Walk and Tum. (R., p. 25) 
The officer then requested that the petitioner-appellant provide some breath samples. The 
breath testing process ,vas interesting, as shown by the video. The petitioner-appellant produced 
one (1) purportedly valid sample and two (2) purportedly insufficient samples. (Tr. p. 11, 1. 12 
p. 12, I. 6) While the petitioner-appellant was in the process of attempting to provide the 
requested breath samples, there was a considerable colloquy between the him and the officer. 
The kindest way to put this is that as the officer was not getting what he wanted, he got more 
aggressive, argumentative, and verbally challenging while, at the same time, the petitioner-
appellant calmly continued to attempt to explain to him that he was doing the best he could but 
he could only provide so much air. This part of the conversation is shown in detail on the video 
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tape of the traffic stop and went something like this: 
Kevin: I'm 55 years old. I'm a smoker. I only have so much air in my lungs. 
Fairley: You can blow more than you are blowing. 
Shortly after that, the petitioner-appellant was anested. (R., p. 26) 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
NO. 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SHOULD BE 
SUSTAINED. 
A. AN INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF VALID BREATH SAMPLES \VERE 
OBTAINED PER THE TESTING PROCEDURES. 
B. THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY TAXED MR. \VERl~ECKE 
\VITH THE EFFECT OF THE T\VO (2) FAILED BREATH SAMPLES. 
ISSlJE NO. 2: THERE \VAS INSUFFICIENT LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE 
PETITIONER 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SHOULD BE 
SUSTAINED. 
Before proceeding with our specific arguments on the substance of the matter, \Ve will 
outline some generalities of the lmv vvhich will govern the appeal as a whole. 
First, in an appeal from a judicial review in the District Court, this Comi on appeal will 
review the agency record independently of the district comi's decision. Laurina v. Board of 
Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho 596, 51 P3d 410 (2002); Pearl v. Board of Professional 
Discipline, 137 Idaho 107, 44p3d 1162 (2002); ,voodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, 
127 Idaho 8, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct. App., 1995). 
In general, revie\vs of administrative decisions are governed by application ofidaho Code 
§§67-5277 and 67-52 In that regard, any review by this Court of issues of fact must be 
confined to what is in the agency record, in this case, the transcript and the exhibits. Idaho Code 
§67-5277 The review of the administrative decision appears overall to be governed by the 
prov1s10ns Idaho Code §67-5279 (3), \Vhich provides, in salient part, that: 
''(3) \\Then the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of !av,; of law to issue an order, the comi, the court shall affirn1 
the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supp01ied by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
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(e) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 
Just as \Vas the case in the district court, this court will defer to the agency's factual 
findings unless they are clearly enoneous. Laurina, supra; Pearl, supra; Whitfield, supra. 
In the instant case, the hearing examiner, Mr. Moody, concluded that Mr. Wernecke had 
failed to carry out the burden of showing that: (1) the officer did not have legal cause to stop his 
vehicle; (2) that the officer did not have legal cause to believe Mr. Wilson violated Idaho Code 
§ 18-8004; (3) that the evidentiary test did not indicate a violation of "Idaho Code § § 18-8004, l 8-
8004C, 1 8-8006"; ( 4) that the evidentiary test was not perforn1ed in compliance with all 
requirements set forth in Idaho law and the ISP Standard Operating Procedure; (5) that the 
instrument ,vas not functioning properly when the test was administered; and ( 6) that he was not 
advised of the possible suspension of his Idaho Driving Privileges. (R., pp. 50-60) We did not 
waive any points raised in our request for hearing to the Department or arguments made during 
the actual ALS hearing, but we focused our argument in the judicial review on certain points and 
continue to do so. In that regard, we have several arguments to make. 
A. AN INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF VALID BREATH SAMPLES \VERE 
OBTAINED PER THE TESTING PROCEDURES. 
The breath testing procedure in Idaho seems to make clear that, in order to have a valid 
breath test for purposes of the DUI law, there must be two (2) valid breath testing samples. 
One of the manuals of ,vhich the hearing officer, Mr. Moody, no doubt took notice, per 
the wording in the Notice of Telephone Hearing (R., pp. 43-44) and what he said in his prefatory 
statement at the beginning of the hearing telephonic hearing (Tr., p. 2, 11. 18-23), was version 6.0 
Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing. A copy of the version of that 
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manual which was in effect at the time of Mr. Wemecke's address was attached hereto as 
Appendix A. On page 14 of that particular manual (R., p. 95), the following is noted: 
"6.2 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) 
valid breath samples taken during the testing 
sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate 
breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes 
apart, or more, for the ASIII's and the FC20's to 
allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol 
contamination. 
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not 
automatically invalidate a test sample. 
6.2.1 If the subject/individual fails or 
refuses to provide a duplicate, 
adequate sample as requested by the 
Operator, the single test result shall 
be considered valid." (Additional 
emphasis ours) 
What seems clear from the foregoing is that there must be two (2) valid breath samples in order 
to have a complete breath alcohol test and that the two (2) tests attempted by Mr. Wernecke 
v,foch yielded the result "insufficient samples" cannot constitute valid breath samples. This is 
where the video recording of the breath testing which was placed in evidence at the ALS hearing 
is valuable because it shows that the officer became more and more impatient with Mr. 
\Vernecke and there certainly seems to be some question from looking at the video whether or 
not Mr. Wernecke was given sufficient time to complete the third "blow" before the officer 
arbitrarily decided to wrap things up. If the officer was unable to get a valid set of t\vo (2) 
samples. he should have either re-perfonned the test sequence or opted for a blood test, which he 
certainly had the ability to do. As noted above, under the procedures in effect at the time of this 
incident, of which procedures the hearing officer was to take notice, the breath samples taken in 
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this case were not legally sufficient to constitute a "complete breath alcohol test". Idaho Code 
§ l 8-8002A requires that, in order to initiate the ALS suspension process, the officer must, within 
five (5) business days following service of the notice of suspension, forward certain things to the 
department, including "a certified or duplicate original of the results of all tests for alcohol 
concentration". The administrative hearing officer is then required, as part of his job, to find that 
the tests were conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), which 
section requires that tests be performed in accordance with a method approved by the Idaho State 
police. The 6.0 Idaho Standard Operating procedure Breath Alcohol Testing manual is one of the 
approved manuals on the Idaho State Police \Veb site. In the absence of any valid breath alcohol 
tests, the ALS process was never validly initiated and, even if validly initiated, should have 
resulted in a reversal of the license suspension because there was not what, in the State's own 
manual, constituted a "complete breath alcohol test". 
There is a case, i.e., the case of State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 913 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App., 
1996), which dealt with a situation where one (1) sample was deemed adequate but we consider 
that case to be inapposite here. l\lills, supra, dealt with a situation where the motorist gave t,vo 
(2) breath samples, one ( 1) of which was a 0.10 and the other of which was a 0.09. The 
argument in that case vvas whether, since one (1) sample was under a 0.10 (the then standard), the 
provision of Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) would kick in and preclude prosecution. The State in that 
case argued a lot of things but what the court ended up deciding was that, since Idaho Code § 18-
8004(2) makes mention of "a'' test, it was not up to the State, via regulation or administrative 
procedure, to require two (2) tests. The court in Mills, supra, appears to say that, if either test 
was below a 0.10, then that was enough for Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) to kick in. There is nothing 
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in Mills, supra, however, which appears to say that the State cannot, by regulation or 
administrative procedure, require that t\vo (2) valid samples must exist to comprise a "complete 
breath alcohol test". 
In addition, there is a real question of whether the officer acted conectly in simply 
tern1inating the testing process when he felt the petitioner was not being cooperative in blowing 
into the instrument. Attached to the petitioner-appellant's initial brief on judicial review as 
Appendix B (R., pp. 104 137) is a true and correct copy of the Lifeloc reference manual and it 
demonstrates that the operator of the Lifeloc is supposed to use a manual test mode of operation 
if the test subject either cannot, or will not, blow a sufficient amount to activate the auto test 
procedure. (R., p. 116) As nearly as \Ve can tell, the officer in this case never did that. By failing 
to use the manual test mode, the ofiicer created a "self-fulfilling prophecy" by relying on the t\VO 
(2) insufficient auto test samples to alloYv him to use the single "valid" test result. 
The result in the administrative hearing must be overturned and the petitioner's privileges 
restored. 
B. THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY TAXED MR. \VERNECKE 
\VITH THE EFFECT OF THE T\VO (2) FAILED BREATH SAMPLES. 
As noted above, at oral argument, the district court raised the fact that neither counsel had 
addressed in their briefs the case of State v. Helfrich, 131 Idaho 349, 955 P .2d 1128 (1998) 
which the court deemed might be salient to the issues at hand, given the facts of the matter before 
the court. 
As this court is aware, the Helfrich, supra, case involved a lady, Esther Helfrich, who 
was anested for driving under the influence. Upon being asked to provide breath samples for the 
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purpose of alcohol testing, Ms. Helfrich was unable to complete a breath test. The officer 
claimed that Helfrich would either spurt air into the tube or would not blow long enough to 
complete the test. Helfrich, supra, p. 349. Ms. Helfrich infonned the officer that she was doing 
the best she could and that she was blowing all the air she could blow. Helfrich, supra. After 
several unsuccessful attempts, which included two "deficient sample" messages, the officer 
concluded that Helfrich could not complete the test because she did not want to. If this all 
sounds so familiar, there is good reason for that because the comments made by the officer to 
Ms. Helfrich \Vere quite similar to Deputy Fairley's comments to Kevin Wernecke in the instant 
case, as shown on the DVD. 
ln Ms. Helfrich's case, the officer deemed the conduct of Ms. Helfrich to be a refusal. A 
hearing was held. The judge viewed the tape of the incident and the officer opined, based on his 
experience and observations, that Ms. Helfrich's attempts to complete the test were 
"disingenuous''. 
lVIs. Helfrich testified that she had bronchitis, which genuinely frustrated her efforts to 
successfully complete the test, something she had not told the officer. She did tell the officer that 
she was on medication for back pain and ,vas doing the best she could. 
The magistrate \vho conducted the hearing in that case ruled against Ms. Helfrich 
because, since she had not specifically inf01111ed the officer that she was suffering from 
bronchitis, she failed to show cause for not completing the test. That ruling was upheld at the 
district court level. 
On appeal to the Idaho Comi of Appeals, things took a different tum. The comi cited to 
the case ofln Re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2d wherein it ,vas noted that: 
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"this cause must articulated to the police officer at the time of the 
refusal so that the officer is given an opportunity to request a different test. We 
hold that a needles may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to 
a request to I. C. § 18-8002 if the fear is of such a magnitude 
that as a practical matter the defendant is psychologically unable to submit to the 
test. And · the fear is sufficiently articulated to the police officer at the time of the 
refusal so that the officer is given an opportunity to request a different test." 
Although Griffiths, supra, dealt vvith fear of needles, the court in Helfrich, supra, found that 
same rationale applicable to a breath test where the suspect was unable to perforn1 that test. As 
Vias noted at pages 351-2 of Helfrich, supra: 
"Here, Helfrich failed to successfully complete the intoxilyzer test a 
number of times. Despite an apparent physical inability feigned or not to blow 
into the tube long enough to fully complete the test, and despite her articulation to 
the officer that she was doing the best she could and blowing all the air she had, 
the officer did not question Helfrich further or ask her to submit to a blood draw. 
Rather, the officer simply assumed that Helfrich was faking her inability to 
complete the test, ceased testing, and seized her license. 
By telling the officer that she was doing the best she could and blowing all 
the air she had, Helfrich sufficiently articulated a physical inability to complete 
the task so as to put the officer on notice that a different test should be utilized. In 
contrast to the situation in Griffiths, nothing in Helfrich's behavior suggested to 
the officer that she would refuse to submit to a different type of alcohol 
concentration test. It was not essential that Helfrich give the officer a medical 
diagnosis for her physical condition, such as 'bronchitis' in order to satisfy the 
Grifflrhs aiiiculation standard. Indeed a suspect may be physically unable to 
complete the breath test because he or she suffers from an undiagnosed illness. In 
such circumstances, the suspect could hardly be required to infonn the officer of 
the cause of the physical condition that was unlmown at the time. 
Helfrich' s demonstrated physical inability to complete the test, coupled 
\Vith her explanation, left the officer \Vith two viable options: (1) he could ask her 
to submit to a different test; or (2) he could interpret her purported inability to 
complete the test as a refusal and have the issue decided at an administrative 
hearing. However, the officer's decision to treat Helfrich's actions as a refusal 
may not be upheld by the corni if Helfrich proves that she suffered from a physical 
impediment which prevented her from successfully completing the breath test." 
Helfrich, supra, is still valid lav,r in the State ofldaho and, in fact, Helfrich, supra, was cited as 
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authority in the subsequent case of State v. \Vaguer, 149 Idaho 268, 1, P.3d 199 (Ct. 
10) court 
''If a driver cannot perform a test, the officer request a different test. 
The inability to take the test must be communicated to the officer so that the 
officer can request a different test." 
With the Helfrich, supra, ruling in mind, two (2) questions remained to be answered in the 
instant case, i.e.: ( 1) is the lack of two (2) valid breath testing samples due to inability to take the 
test a valid defense to a suspension in an ALS case? and (2) did Kevin Wernecke sufficiently 
communicate to the officer his inability to perfom1 the test? 
The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes". Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) set 
forth a laundry list ofreasons v;hy the suspension of the driver's privileges will be vacated and 
subpart ( d) states: 
"( d) the tests for alcohol concentration, drugs, or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted 
in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly \Vhen the test was administered; 
( emphasis ours)" 
As the Court will recall, Idaho Code § 18-8004( 4) requires that tests be perforn1ed in accordance 
with a method approved by the Idaho State police and that takes us back to the 6.0 Idaho 
Standard Operating procedure Breath Alcohol Testing which is one of the approved manuals on 
the Idaho State Police web site. As has been abundantly set forth above, two (2) valid samples 
are required to comprise a complete breath test. Thus, it would appear to us that the rationale of 
Helfrich, supra, ,vould be applicable in ALS suspension case, just as it is in refusal cases. 
That leaves the question of whether Kevin Wernecke sufficiently articulated his inability 
to complete the test to Officer Fairley. When the testing process started, the was an ongoing 
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colloquy betvveen Kevin and the officer about the officer's complaints that Kevin Wernecke was 
not blowing long enough or hard enough. That colloquy was roughly as follows: 
Kevin: I'm 55 years old. I'm a smoker. 1 only have so much air in my lungs. 
Fairley: You can blmv more than you are blowing. 
While it is c01Tect that Kevin Wernecke produced what was apparently one valid sample, he had 
tvvo tries where be simply could not produce enough air to satisfy the breath testing device. 
Kevin Wernecke articulated to the officer that he was 55 years old and a smoker and that he had 
only so much air in his lungs. What Kevin Wernecke told the officer was remarkably similar to 
what Mrs. Helfrich told the officer in her case. That satisfied the standard of Helfrich. supra. 
Beyond that, there is an additional argument to be made. The 6.0 Idaho Standard 
Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing defines a valid breath test. Section 6.2 of that 
manual ( on page 15 of 21) states. in part: 
"A complete breath alcohol test includes tvm (2) valid breath samples 
taken during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks." ( emphasis ours) 
So, we can see immediately from the most cursory review of this language that there is a 
distinction between a "complete breath alcohol test" and a "sample". 
It is true that, on that same page of the manual, that the following language is included: 
"6.2.1 If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a 
duplicate, adequate sample as requested by the 
Operator, the single test result shall be considered 
valid". 
Of course, as one might imagine, officers want to seize upon that provision and decide 
that they will have a "complete breath alcohol test" with just one ( 1) valid sample. Of course, 
that view runs head-on into section 6.2.4 of 6.0 Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath 
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Alcohol Testing, on page 16 of2L which states: 
"6.2.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a duplicate, 
adequate sample as requested by the Operator, the results obtained 
are still considered valid by the ISPFS, provided the failure to 
supply the requested samples n·as the fault of the 
Sll~ject/individual and not the Operator". (emphasis ours) 
6.2.4.1 Failure to provide a complete breath test due to the lack of 
0.020 correlation in the samples provided needs to be 
clearly a1iiculated that the lack of sample correlation was 
the fault of the subject and not of the instrument or of the 
samples themselves. The officer's observations of the 
subject need to be clear enough to explain any 
discrepancies .... " 
The hearing officer, on page 5 of his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, 
noted that he relied on sections 6.2.2.3.1, 6.2.4, and 6.2.4.1. (R., p. 54) Without getting into an 
argument about ,vhether section 6.2.4.1 even applies, it appears that section 6.2.4 provides 
sufficient basis for the court to rule in favor of the petitioner because that section notes that the 
lack of duplicate samples \Yill not invalidate the test so long as the failure to provide the 
duplicate, valid sample \Yas the fault of the subject/individual. If, in fact, Kevin Wernecke 
sufficiently articulated to the officer that he did not have sufficient breath to complete two (2) 
samples, then the rule in Helfrich, supra, will take over and it will not be the fault of Kevin 
Wernecke that there were not two (2) valid samples. That being the case, there was never a valid 
breath test and the suspension of Kevin's driving privileges should have been vacated. 
As a further point, we note that the hearing officer stated in subpoint 3.6 of his decision, 
on page 5 thereof (R., p. 54 ), the following: 
"6. Although only one evidentiary breath sample was obtained, this sample 
is considered valid by ISFPS since Wernecke failed to demonstrate Deputy 
Fairley or the Lifeloc FC20 caused Wernecke to produce two insufficient 
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samples. See ISPFS SOP §§ 6.2.2.3.1. 
The language set forth above seems to make clear that the hearing officer only paiiially 
articulated the standard in section 6.2.4. 
ISSUE NO 2: THERE ,VAS INSUFFICIENT LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE 
PETITIONER. 
The officer claimed to have stopped the petitioner for improper driving consisting of a 
wide tum and traveling on the wrong side of the road. 
~fr. Wernecke testified extensively at the ALS hearing from page 6, line 9, through page 
9, L 14 of the transcript. In his testimony, Mr. Wernecke stated the following: 
1. That the vehicle J\fr. \Vemecke was driving that day is a Ford 3500 
extended cab pickup, which is a one-ton vehicle with dual wheels (Tr., p. 6, 11. 12-
18); 
2. He testified that it is a vehicle which tyvically requires wide turns 
around corners (Tr., p. 6, 11. 19-21); 
3. He testified that Tenth Street, the street onto which he turned from the 
main drag was both "pretty narrow" and had a large pothole on the corner, as a 
consequence of which one either needed to turn way to the left and drive down the 
center of the street or else turn to the extreme right, which \Yould take one off the 
road surface (p. 6, I. 22 p. 7, I. 19); 
4. That off of Tenth he would have had to turn right onto Larch Street, that 
Larch ,vas 11a1Tow, and that it had cars along the side, requiring him to swing wide 
once again. (p. 8, 1. 3 p. 9, I. 11) 
In response to this testimony, the hearing officer decided to cite some Idaho traffic law statutes 
wfoch he felt showed that Mr. Wemecke's wide turns were in violation of the law and, therefore, 
do not provide a valid excuse. Unfortunately for Mr. Moody's decision, his reading of the two 
(2) statutes he cited was not very comprehensive. 
The first statute Mr. Moody cited was Idaho Code §49-644 (R., p. 52) That statute states, 
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in salient part, as follows: 
"49-644. REQUIRED POSITION AND METHOD OF TURNING. The 
driver of a vehicle intending to turn shall do as follows: 
( 1) Both the approach for a right tum and the right tum 
shall be as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of 
the roadway .... " (Emphasis ours) 
This statute, contrary to what Mr. Moody may think or believe, appears to create a relativistic 
situation because it does not pose an absolute requirement for where the vehicle must be driven 
but, rather, mandates for the turn to be made as close "as practicable". What that would mean, in 
our viev,', is that one is certainly free to avoid impediments or to turn in a way consistent with the 
construction of one's vehicle. 
The other statute Mr. Moody cited was Idaho Code §49-630 (R., p. 52) That statute 
provides, in salient part, as follov,:s: 
''49-630. DRJVE ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROADWAY EXCEPTIONS. 
(1) Upon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right 
half of the roadway except as follows: 
(b) W7zen an obstruction exists making it necessary to 
drive to the left of center of the highway. Any person doing so 
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper 
direction upon the unobstructed p011ion of the highway within a 
distance as to cause an immediate hazard .... " (Emphasis ours) 
Once again, we can see that the statute in question is not as absolute as Mr. Moody would make 
it out to be. Mr. Wernecke testified under oath as to why his vehicle was where it was on the 
roadway and his testimony is not really controverted in the record. Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) 
provides that the motorist can prevail if the officer did not have legal cause to stop the vehicle. 
We argue that the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Wernecke shows that the officer did not, in 
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case, have cause to stop him. Mr. Wernecke's suspension should be overturned and his 
ISSUE NO. 3: THERE \VAS INSUFFICIENT CAUSE TO REQUIRE THE 
BREATH TEST. 
This is an interesting argument because the officer was wearing a chest camera which, 
unlike the dash cameras frequently used by police, showed most of the field sobriety tests in 
exquisite detail. There were three (3) tests actually performed, i.e., horizontal gaze nystagmus, 
the alphabet, counting. Mr. \Vernecke told the officer his sense of balance was such that he 
could not perform any balance tests. 
Even the most cursory review of the video on the DVD which was sent to Mr. Moody and 
which is in the record as an exhibit indicates that Mr. Wernecke conectly performed the alphabet 
test and the counting test. As to the gaze nystagmus, it is impossible to see that there was any 
untmvard eye movement during the test, although Mr. Wernecke \\'as having a hard time obeying 
the requirement that he not move his head at all. 
Mr. Wernecke' s speech and his walking and balance were all completely visible to the 
camera and, to our eyes, exhibited no abnormalities. 
Under Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7), it is a defense to the suspension of driving privileges if 
there was not adequate cause to request that the petitioner be tested. 
For this reason as well, the petitioner-appellant's privileges should be restored. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is a good example of the sort of "train wreck" which is created by the Idaho 
Code provisions setting up this administrative license suspension process and the procedures 
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which the Idaho Department of Transportation has put in place to implement that process. The 
hearings are perfunctory at best and it is clear that, while the hearing officers seem clearly not to 
be attorneys, or at least not well-trained attorneys, they feel empowered, nonetheless, to cite and 
interpret the Idaho traffic statutes and to interpret the provisions which the Idaho State Police 
have put in place to fuel this \Vhole suspension process. In this case the system failed Mr. 
Wernecke, starting with a bit of a hot-tempered and impatient police officer and going all the 
way through to an administrative hearing officer who ,vas obviously not familiar with the 
approved breath testing manuals and procedures and not able to correctly read and interpret the 
traffic statutes. The decision upholding the suspension of Kevin Wernecke's driving privileges 
should be reversed with instruction on remand to restore those privileges. 
DATED this~ctober, 2014. 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing brief were mailed, 
first-class postage prepaid to: 
EchvinLitteneker 
322 kfain Street 
Lewisto 1, ID 83501 
~ 
day of October, 2014. 
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